







IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY OF THE BAND




ISSN 0924-7815IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY OF Tt~ BAND AND RISK PREMIA
IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
Roel Beetsae
CentER~Tflburg Unfversíty, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Titburg, The NetherLanda.
Abstract
This article deals wlth the estimation of models for the expected rate of
depreciation within the currency bands of the French franc and the Italian
lira egainat the Deutsche Mark, both unconditional and conditional upon no
realignment, as well as the estimation of models for risk premia. Using
these estimates, estimatea are constructed for the expected rate of
depreciation, the expected rate of realignment and the expected rate of
devaluation of these exchange rates during their EMS period by appropriate
adjustment of interest differentials. It ia found that these adjustments are
of non-trivial magnitude.
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Despite growing consensus among economiata in recent yeara that the European
Monetary System (EMS) has become increasingly successful in atabilizing
exchange ratea between participants, the developments ín September and
November 1992 have demonstrated that the currency bands are atill far from
credible. For the Britiah pound participation in the syatem oP bilateral
exchange rate bands hea been abandoned, while for the Italian lira it has
been suapended shortly after a realignment. Moreover, the Spanish peseta has
undergone two realignments, and the French franc end the Irish punt have
been under heavy speculative pressure. In view of these events it seems
important to be able to make en appropriate assessment of the expected rate
of depreciation of exchange rates in the system, and, related to this, their
devaluation risk and their realignment risk (below, the differences between
these terms will be made precise). Estimatea of theae variablea provide us
with information about the credibility of the exchange rate bands as
perceived by the market end how this credibility of the banda changea over
time. Therefore, in this paper we try to construct estimates for these
variables of interest. In our definition, the expected depreciation rate is
the expected rate of change of the exchange rate. The difference between a
realignment and a develuation is that a devaluation measures the actual jump
of the exchange rate at a realignment, which is the aum of the jump in the
central parity (the realignment itself) and the jump in the deviation of the
exchange rate from ita central parity.
One of the papers, which originates from the literature on exchange rate
target zonee and which addresses the problem of inferring realignment risk,
ia Bertola and Svensaon (1991). In their model, realignment riak is an
exogenous stochastic process, and, under some specific essumptiona about
this process, they simulate patterns of exchange rate time series which
resemble the movementa of the French franc~Deutsche Mark (Ffr~DM) over time.
They indicate how empirical estimatea of realignment riak may be constructed
by subtracting estimatea of expected changes of the exchange rate within its
band from intereat differentiala. Rose end Svensson (1991) use this method-z-
to estimate realignment risk for EMS exchange ratea, and with a aimilar
procedure Svensaon (1991c) obtaina eatimates of their devaluation risk.
Indeed, the adjuatmenta of the intereat differentisls to construct eatimatea
of these variablea of interest are of non-trivial magnitude, so that it ia
important to obtain appropriate estimates of the movementa of the exchange
rate within its band. Lindberg, Svensson end StSderlind (1991) use the
approach just outlined to estimate realignment expectations for the target
zone of the Swediah krone against a weighted average of the currenciea of
its main trading partners. They apply a variety of estimation methods end
use a number of specifications to eatimate the expected change of the
exchange rate within its band. For the papers mentioned, specification of
models for this variable are based on the predictions of the target zone
literature, in particular that there should be a nearly linear relationahip
between the expected rate of depreciation within the band and the deviation
of the exchange rate from its central parity.
In this paper, we try to extend the analyais of the papera just mentioned in
a number of wa,ys. First, theae papers make the asaumption of uncovered
interest parity (UIP), while, elsewhere in the empirical literature, there
is strong evidence of (time-varying) risk premie, especially in forward
markets for dollar exchange ratea [e.g., see Hodrick (198~) and the
referencea therein]. This dces not necessarily imply however, that there is
a risk-premium in FalS exchange rates as well. In fact, Svenason (1990) usea
a target zone model, in which there is some exogenoua end conatant
probability of a realignment irrespective of the exchange rate position in
its band. He derives an expression for the riak premium, which consiats of
two components: one due to exchange rate movements in the band, and the
other due to devaluation risk. The firat one is proportional to the varience
of the exchange rate in its band and is shown to be negligible. The second
one is shown to be small relative to the expected rate of change in the
central parity for reasonable values of the model parametera. However, aince
tests of target zone modela on EMS exchange ratea have not been very
successful [e.g., see Meese and Rose (1990) and Flood, Rose and Mathieson
(1991)] and Svensson'a (1990) aeaumptions about the realignment procese are
rather restrictive, it is not clear to what extent his argument iaapplicable to EMS exchange rates. Therefore, it aeems safer to relax the UIP
esaumptíon and let the data decide about the presence of a risk premius.
Because the expected rete of realignment, the expected rate of depreciation
within the band and the risk premium are linked by an identity, we model
them jointly, using the same regression specification for each variable and
applying adding up restrictions, which are automatically fulfilled in our
apecial ceae. As explanatory variables we include variables auggeated by the
target zone literature, like the poaition of the exchange rate in the bend
and nonlinear terms, end the forward díscount, because of the identity juat
mentioned. To conatruct estimatea for the expected rate of devaluation, one
needs to have estimates of the expected rate of depreciation within the band
conditional on the absence of a realignment. Specification of madela for
thiH varlnbl„ In nl~~nK thn aame llnes ne for t.he other variablea.
Our empirical analysís is reatricted to the Ffr~DM end the lira~Deutache
Mark (lira~DM), because these are the exchange ratea between the largest
economies in the EMS, which have participated in the Exchange Rate Mechenias
from its start onwards. Moreover, as already noticed, they have been under
heavy pressure recently, which makes them intereating to atudy.
The estimates auggest that important determínants of the unconditional
expected rate of depreciation within the band are the current position in
the band, and, in partícular for the Ffr~DM, the forward diacount. The
position of the exchange rate in the band is alao en importent determinant
of the conditíonal (upon no realignment) expected rate of depreciation
within the band. For the Ffr~DM there are alight indications of the presence
of nonlinearities, but this is not the case for the lira~DM. The reaulta
suggest the presence of a risk premium which is small and fairly conatant
for the Ffr~DM, but highly time-varying for the lira~DM, where the forward
discount is an important explanatory variable of the risk premium. It
bur'omee Hliuhle from tíme to tíme and it íe often of the eame magnítude ea
the expected rate of depreciation within the band. Contrary to what one
míght have expected, the poaition of the exchange rate in the band dces not
seem to have any explanatory power for the risk premium. Adjusting intereat-4-
differentials with Germany for our estimatea (unconditional and conditional
upon no realignment) of the expected rate of depreciation within the bend,
it is possible to construct estimates for the expected rates of realignment
and devaluation under UIP. When UIP ia relaxed, for all variables of
intereat - the expected rates of depreciation, realignment end devaluation -
an additional sdjustment has to be made for the estimated risk premium. Note
that riak premium estimates are interesting in their own right also, becauae
they give an indication about the costs of not formally ruling out any
further realignments in the FaiS. For example, real interest pc~yments on
government debt of countries with a weak currency are higher if there is an
exchange rate risk premium.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we
show how our variables of interest relate to each other. Section 3 motivates
the empirical specifications for the regression analysis. Section 4 presenta
estimates of expected ratea of depreciation within the band, unconditional
and conditional upon no realignment, while section 5 presents estimates of
the risk premium. In section 6, we asaess and compare (under UIP end when
UIP is relaxed) the adjustments of interest differentisls which are needed
to conatruct estimates of our variables of interest. Section ~ concludes the
paper.
2. The expected rates of depreciation, realignment and devaluatioe.
Define st as the logarithm (in the sequel all variables are in logarithms
unless otherwise atated) of the nominal exchange rate (measured as the
number of units of the home currency needed to buy one Deutsche Mark) and ct
as the central parity of the exchange rate. Furthermore, we refer to xt~ at-
ct as the exchange rate within the band. Then the expected rate depreciation
of the exchange rate over some time interval from t to t~T is the expected
change of the exchange rate in percentages on an annusl basis, hence is
given by Et[ASttT]~T ' Et[at~T- at]It. Later on, in our empirical
investigation, we shall take T to be a month (1~12 year).-5-
The expected rete ot realignment is given by Et[ct~T]~T, where a realignmient
refers to the jump in the central parity, which occurs when the band on the
exchange rate is changed. By a devaluation, we mean the actusl jump in the
exchenge rate at a realignment. Hence, a devaluation ia the sum of the jump
in the central parity and the jump of the exchange rate within the band at a
realignment. It is important to distinguish between realignments and
devaluations, because often the jump of the exchenge rate within the band ie
of the seme order of inegnitude ea the jump oP the central parity, as we
shall see.
The expected rate of depreciation can be linked to the expected rate of
realignment, using the definition of the expected rate of depreciation
within the band
Et[nat,Tl z Et[nCt4T] . Et[nxt~T] . (I)
The expected rate of depreciation ia the sum of the expected rate of
realignment and the expected rate of depreciation within the band, or,
alternatively, the expected rate of realignment is obtained by subtracting
the expected rate of depreciation within the band from the expected rate of
depreciation of the exchenge rete.
Denote by ft T thw forward rate at time t for a contract due at time ttT.
and by b ~ i - i the interest differentiel on an annual basis at time
L.T t.T t.T
t for deposits of the seme default risk and the same time to maturity T~O.
Thus, it T is t:e nominal interest rate on deposits denoted in the home
currency and it T the nominal interest rate on depoaits denoted in Deutsche
Marks.
Assuming covered interest parity ( CIP), one has
bt.T ~ (ft T- at)IT ,
Furthermore, one has the identity
íz)Et~~tt~~ ~~ft.T- etat~~] L( ft t- st) . (3)
where [ft,T- Etaty ~ will be referred to as the risk premiua. It ia the
T
difference between the forward rate and the expected future apot rate at the
maturity of the forward contract. Under uncovered intereat parity, the risk
premium should be zero, and the expected rate of depreciation of the
exchange rate equala the interest differential.
Upon aubetitution of (1) into (3), one obtains
Et[nCt4T] i Et[nxt~t] ` Cft,i- Etat~t] -(ft.T- St) , (4)
which states that the forward diacount equala the sum of the expected rate
of realignment, the expected rate of depreciation within the band and the
risk premium. If market partícipants are risk neutral, then (4) reducea to
Et~ncttT] t Et[nxt~j] - ( ft,t- at) .
which, together with the assumption of CIP, impliea UIP.
(5)
One way to test for UIP, is to apecify a regression model for the expected
rate of realignment end the expected rete of deprecietion within the band,
including the same regressora (the forward discount ahould be one of the
regressors) in both equations, end teat for the implied adding-up
restrictions by (5).
A complication with regressions based on (4) end (5) is that xt (and other
variables as well) usuelly ~umpa at realignments, as Svenason (1991c) notes.
This might introduce a small sample bias in the estimatea, because the total
number of jumps of xt could be too small to obtain reliable results. Figures
la and lb plot the Ffr~DM end the lira~DM exchange rates respectively,
together with the boundaries of their fluctuation margina. The date are
daily from 13 March 19~9 (the start oP the EMS) till 16 May 1990. Details
about the data ace given in the appendix. During the sample period, the
central parity of the Ffr~DM has undergone aix realignments and the central-7-
parity of the liralDM nine realignments. Note that for the FfrIDM at every
realignment the jump in the exchange rate is less in magnitude then the jump
in the central parity, while for the liralDM this is the case for the
majority of the realignments. Thia implies that the exchange rate within the
band usually jumps at a realignment. Svensson (1991c) propoaea to rewrite
the expected rate of depreciation within the band as follows
Et[Axt~i] ` (1'Pt) Et[axt;T~NR] ' pt EtL~xt4t~R]
: Et[ext4~~NR] - Pt {Et[xt`S~NR] - Et[xt4~~R]} . (6)
where pt ia defined es the probability that a realignment will occur between
time t and time tti and where R end NR denote the events of a realignment,
reapectively no realignment between t and tit. Subatituting (6) into (4),
end rearranging, one obtains
Et[~cttT]IT t Pt{Et[xt4~~NR] - Et[xt{T~R]}IT
' (ft.T- at)It - Et[nxtat~NRlli - [ft T- Etst4T]IZ
~bts- Et[nxt;t~NR]IT - [ft.z- Etat.T]I~ . l7)
In Svensson (1991c), the term -[ft T- Etst4T]It on the right hand side of
(7) drops out, because he easumes UIP. Following Svensaon, we refer to the
left-hend aide of (7) as the operational definition of the expected rate of
devaluation, or, as we will do in the following, simply the 'expected rate
of devaluation'. One can conatruct estimatea for the expected rate of
devaluation by estimating modela for the conditional expected rate of
depreciation within the band and the risk premium and subtract these
estimatea from the interest differential.3. Specification ot the regresaion modela
In thia section we ahall motivate the regresaion specifications which we use
for the eatimation of the conditional and unconditional expected ratea of
depreciation within the band, es well es the risk premium, for the case
where we relax UIP. As already explained, these estimates can be uaed to
obtain estimatea of our variablea of interest.
The regression models in Rose and Svensson (1991) end Svensson (1991c) are
motivated by the predictions of the target zone literature. One of their
explanatory variablea for the expected rate of change of the exchange rate
within the band is the current exchange rate within the band, xt, in order
to pick up a potential mean-reversion of the exchenge rate within the band.
In fact, in the standard target zone model [see Krugman (1991)] and some of
its generalizations [see Svensson (1991a,b)], where there is en exogenous
and constant probability of a realignment, the exchenge rate within the bend
is meen-revertíng and it is the only determinant of the expected future
exchange rate position in the band. The relationship between these two
variablea is almost linear as Svensson (1991b) ahows. To check for the
presence of non-linearities that might be induced by the presence of the
boundariea on the exchange rate, Rose and Svensson (1991) also include xt
and xt as regresaors. Furthermore, they introduce a dummy for each exchenge
rate regime, where a regime is defined as the period between two
realignmenta. In this wa,y one might allow for the effecta of potential
changea in monetary policies after realignments (e.g., changea in relative
growth rates of money supplies).
We follow Rose and Svensson (1991) and Svensson (1991c) in our choice of the
regresaion specifications, but, in addition, we include the forward discount
as a regressor, for reesons outlied in the previous section, but also
because many of the empirical studies [e.g., see Hodrick (1987) and the
references therein], find that the forward discount has significant
explenatory power for the risk premium:-9-
r 3 k
EtlGCtiT~IT - i~l a0ldii k~l mlkxt ' a2(ft,T- at) , (8a)
r 3 k
Et(Axt~T~~T ' 1~1 ~Oid1~ ktl ~lkxt i~2(ft,T- at) , (8b)
r 3 k
Et~ft,t- at.T~~T ' i~l YOidi~ k~l Ylkxt i Y2(ft,S- st) ' (8c)
where r ia the number of regimes and where the dependent variablea have baen
divided by T in order to obtain coefficient estimates on an annuel basis. By
including xt in (Sa) end (8c) one might pick up effects of the poaition of
the exchange rate in ita band on realignment expectations and on the risk
premium, because it is often said that the credibility of the band comes
into question when s weak currency approachea the upper boundary of its band
with the Deutsche Mark.
Equationa (4) and (8a)-(8c) imply:
a01} ~Oi~ r0ia
0 , i~l,..,r ,
oclk. ~lkt ylk 0 , k~1....3 .
~ZtyZ~rZ-1~T.
(9)
Because ell regressors are predetermined at time t, we can use ordinary
least squares to obtain consistent estimates of their coefficients. The
adding-up restrictions (9) are automatically fulfilled by the estimates end
the reaiduals sum up to zero (over the equations) for all t. In the presence
of the well-known overlapping observationa problem (the time to maturity T
exceeda the sampling interval) consistent eatimatea of the atandard errors
are obtained by using the method proposed in Newey and Weat (198~). It ia
also easy to see that in the underlying case, where the set of regresaors is
the same for all equations, simultaneoua estimation oF two out of three
equations yields exactly the seme results as separate estimation, both for
the ccefficient estimates and for the estimated standard errors.-10-
Imposing p2 ~ 0 in (8b) gives one of the specifications that Rose end
Svensson (1991) uae for the (unconditional) expected rate of depreciation
within the band. UIP is tested by testing the hypotheais that all
coefficients in (8c) are jointly equal to zero [Y01(di) ~ Ylk(~k) ' Y2~ 0]'
which says that, given the information in the right hand aide variablea oP
(8c), the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.
Rejection of this hypothesis suggesta the presence of a, posaibly tioe-
varying, riak-premium. The hypothesis of a constant risk yre~iu~ ia
formulated as the joint hypothesis that the dummy ccefficients are all equsl
to each other but different from zero, and that all other ccefficienta in
(8c) are zero [Y0i- Y0~ 0, Ylk(yk) a Y2~ 0]. If the dummy coefficients are
not equel to each other, and all other ccefficienta in (8c) are zero, then
this suggests the presence of a risk-premium which is constant for a given
regime, but which changes at a realignment, because of a jump in the
perceived riskineas of the exchange rate.
To analyse the expected rate of devaluation [eq.(~)] we specify for the




a iFl a01di } k~l ~lkxt `~2(ft,T- at) ' (l0a)
The complementary regression equation is:
r 3
Et[ft ,~- st~T~~]~t ` iEl YOidi ~ kEl Ylkxt ` Y2(ft T- st) ,
so that p0i' YOiS 0 yi, ~lka Ylk: 0 yk, and S2~ Y2- l~t.
(lOb)
When the nonlinear terms and the forward discount are excluded fron (l0a)
(~12a ~13a ~2~ 0), Svenason's (1991c) apecification ia obtained.4. Estimates ot the unconditional and conditional expected
rates of depreciation within the band.
In thia aection estimates are presented for the expected rate of
depreciation within the bend, both unconditional and conditional upon no
realignment. Theae estimates 'c'án be used to conatruct eatisatea of our
variablea of intereat under UIP. Then, the expected rate of depreciation is
given by the intereat differential. The expected ratea of realignment [aee
eq.(5)] and devaluation [aee eq.(7)] can be eatimated by subtracting en
estimate of the unconditional, respectively, conditional expected rate of
depreciation within the band from the interest differentiel. Thus, in this
aection, the main difference with Rose and Svensson (1991) and Svensaon
(1991c) is the use of more extenaive apecificationa for the unconditional
and conditional expected rate of depreciation within the band. In the next
section, we present risk premium eatimatea, which enable use to construct
estimates for our variables of interest when UIP is relaxed.
Aa slready explained, here, and in the sequel, eatimatlon tekea place by
OLS, using the Newey and West (1987) adjustment for the standard errors.
Tables la (Ffr~DM) and lb (lira~DM) present estimates for various reatricted
apecifications of Et[dct}~], the unconditional expected rate of depreciation
within the band. To save space, we only report resulta for specificationa
for which the dummy ccefficients are restricted to be equel across regisea.
Earlier regressions (not reported here) suggest that unrestricted estimation
results in dummy coefficient estimates which are very sensitive to the
backward jump of the exchange rate within the band, which takes place at the
end of each regime. Also, we are not able to compare our results with thoae
obtained by Rose and Svensaon (1991), who use an unrestricted apecification,
because they report estimatea that are numerically identical Svensaon's
(1991c) estimates of the conditional expected rate of depreciation within
the band, which must be due to a reportíng error. Columns (a) of tablea le~b
ahow that for both the Ffr~DM end the lira~DM, the current position of the
exchenge rate in its band enters with a negative ccefficient, indicating-12-
mean-reversion of the exchange rate within the band. In both cases, the t-
ratios are well below -2.86, the crítical value (at a 5X level) of the
standard Dickey-Fuller [see Fuller (1976)] unit root test. One ahould be
careful however, because the potentisl presence of conditional
heteroskedasticity may invalidate these atandard critical valuea to a
certain extent. In columna (b) of tables la~b, estimates are reported for a
specification in which the nonlinear terms xt and xt are added. The reaults
auggest that nonlinearítíes may plsy a role, but one has to be careful
because the ~umps in xt may cause outliera in the nonlinear terma, which
could have influenced the estimates. Columns (c) report resulta for the case
where we add the forward discount as an additional explanatory variable. For
the Ffr~DM both the forward diacount and the position in the band are
significant at a SX level. The significantly negative ccefficient of the
forward discount can be explained by the fact that for the Ffr~DM extremely
high interest differentials are often followed by a realignment, at which xt
jumps downward. For the lira~DM, only the exchange rate within the band ia
significant, although the forward discount is close to significance.
In tables 2a (Ffr~DM) end 2b (lira~DM), estimates are given for models of
the expected depreciation rate within the band, conditional upon no
realignment. The specifications corresponding to columns (s) are the seme as
the ones estimated by Svensson (1991c), and, indeed, our estimates are
numerically the same as Svensson's estimates. For the majority of the
realignmenta, the dummy ccefficients enter with poaitive aign, which is
explained by the fact, that usuelly, at a realignment, the exchange rate
jumps from a weak position in its old band to a stronger position in its new
band, and starts to depreciate after the realignment. For both currencies,
the hypothesis that the dummy coefficients are equal across regimea ia
rejected for all specifications. Contrary to the case where we did not
condition on the absence of realignments, here we do not expect the dummy
ccefficient estimatea to auffer from outliers. There are two main
differences with the resulta for the unconditional expected rate oP
dapreciat.ion within the band. Firet, the forwerd discount has loat much of
its explanatory power [columna (c)]. The reason is that the realignmente end
the jumps of the exchange rate within the band coincide and are uauslly-13-
preceded by peaks in the forward diacount, in particular for the Ffr~DM.
Secondly, for the lira~DM, the estimated ccefficient of xt hes also lost
much of ita explenatory power, which can be explained by the exclusion of
the downward jumps in xt at realignments. These j umps exert a mean-reverting
influence. Again, note that for the Ffr~DM there is some indication of
nonlinearitiea [column (b), table 2s].
5. Estimatea ot the risk premium
Tables 3a (Ffr~DM) and 3b (lira~DM) present estimates for varioua
apecifications of the riak premium model. As explained before, we reatrict
the dummy ccefficienta to be equsl acrosa regimes. For both currencies and
ell specifications, the hypothesis that the regression ccefficients are
jointly equal to zero is rejected. This suggesta the presence of a riak
premium, contrery to what Rose and Svensaon (1991) and Svensson (1991c)
asaume. Columna ( a) report the reaulta when only a constant ia included ea a
regresaor. For both exchange rates it is significant. The inWrpratntion is
interesting. For most of the sample the forward rate lies above the realized
apot rate at maturity date. Only in case of a reallgnment between date t end
taT, the realized spot rate lies above the forward rate. When market
participsnts are risk neutral these occasional jumps of sttT beyond it ~
should on average offset that ft t liea above at~S for most of the time. The
position of the exchange rate within the band [columna (b)] ia neither
significant for the Ffr~DM nor for the lira~DM, which is a remarkable,
beceuse it is often suggested that realignment risk increases in the H~S
when the exchange rate approaches the weak edge of its band. Including
nonllnear terms [columns (c)] dces not have a aignificant effect on the
results either, although for the Ffr~DM the cubic term is not far from
significance. Columna (d) report resulta for a specification which includes
a conatant end the forward diacount. The difference between columna (d) and
(e) is that for the latter the exchange rate within the band has been
included as an additional regressor. Although xt is far from significance
for both currencies, we report the resulta for this regression, because, in
order to construct estimates for our variables of interest, we prefer to uae
the same regression specification for both the risk premium and the exchange-14-
rate within the bend [as auggested by eq.(8e)-(8c)]. For the Ffr~DM the
forward discount dcea not enter significantly, but for the lira~DM it doea
(at a 5z level). Thia auggeata the presence of a time-varying risk-premium
for the lira~DM. The significantly positive estimate of the coefficient oP
the forward discount indicates that if the forward rate ia above the current
spot rate (which ia the cese for most of the time}, then for being certain
about the price at which they cen sell liras for Deutache Marka at maturity
date, agenta pay a riak premium. The riak premium ia quite sizable: if the
forward discount ia o.5x (6x on en ennual basie), the riak premium im almost
2.5X on an ennual basis (taking into account the estimate for the constant).
6. Estioatea of expected ratea of depreciation, realignment and devaluation
In this section, adjustments of interest differentials used to construct
estimates of our variables of interest, both under UIP end when UIP ia
relaxed, are shown and discussed.
Figures 3a.i and 3b.1 depict the one-month interest differential between
France and Germany, respectively between Italy and (iermany. Here, and in the
sequel, plotted variables are in percentages on an annual Dasia. Under UIP,
the expected rate of depreciation equala the intereat differential. For soat
of the time the French-German interest differentiel is fairly flat. However,
especially the period from the beginning of 1981 until the realignment in
March 1983 seems to be one of serious criaea in the Ffr~DM. To a lesaer
extent thia is also the case for the period around the realignment in April
1986. For Italy, the intereat differential has more peaka, elthough not auch
an extreme one as the French~German peak in March 1983. Still it ia clear,
except for Italian-Germen differential in the second half of 1981, that the
most turbulent periods in both currencies coincide. This coincidea with the
ex-poat observation that the majority of the realignments of the lira~DM and
the Ffr~DM were joint ones. The observation that the peaks in the intereat
differentials for both exchange rates are lesa pronounced for later years in
our semple, is conaiatent with the fact that at more recent realignmenta the
exchange rate itself did not jump so much.-15-
Unconditional eatimates of expected ratea of depreciation within the band
are ahown in figurea 3a.2 and 3b.2, while conditlonal (on the absence of a
realignment) estimates are shown in figures 3a.3 end 3b.3. The underlying
specificationa include a constant [for the unconditional estimates; tablea
la~b, columns (c)] or dummies [for the conditional eatimates; tablea 2s~b,
columna (c)], the exchange rate within the band, end the forward diacount.
For the unconditional eatimates, the latter variable has a atrong influence
on the estimates, as ahown by the large and negative peaks which coincide
with the peaks in the interest differential. As already explained, thia
effect disappears when one conditions on the absence of realignments.
Figurea 3s.4 and 3b.4 plot constructed estimates of the risk premium for
respoctively Cha Ffr~DM and the lira~DM. Again the underlying specifications
[tables 3s~b, columns (e)] include s constant, the exchange rate within the
band and the forward discount. For the Ffr~DM the estimated riak premium ia
small and more or less constant over time. More interesting are the
estimates for the risk premium in the lira~DM, which are clearly non-
negligible, and have pronounced peaks during periods of crises (second half
of 1981 till March 1983; also prior to the realignment in April 1986).
Hence, increases in the risk premium indeed coincide with periods of unreat,
which have often been followed by a realignment. During later yeara in our
sample the risk premium seems to have decreased on average, elthough it
would be interesting to see how its estimates would behave during the
turbulent months September and November 1992.
Under UIP the expected rate of depreciation of the exchenge rate equals the
interest differentiel. When UIP is relaxed, estimates of the expected rate
of depreciation can be constructed by subtracting risk premium estimates
(figures 3a~b.4) from the interest differential (figures 3a~b.1). In
particular for the lira~DM this adjustment is non-trivial. Estimatea for the
expected rate of realignment under UIP are obtained by subtracting
unconditional estimates of the expected rate of depreciation within the bend
(figures 3e~b.2) from the intereat differential. The adjustment ia
important, especially for the Ffr~DM, where peaks in the interest
differential get even more pronounced. The reason is that under UIP the-16-
interest differential prior to realignments should be of the aeme order of
magnitude ea the jump in the exchange rate, while the estimated expected
rate of realignment ahould correspond to the jump in the central parity,
which is uaually larger than the jump in the exchange rate (note that the
exchange rate within the band jumps back at realignmenta). Outaide perioda
of crises, adjustment of interest differentials for the estimated expected
rate of depreciation within the band ia also important. For moat of the time
during theae periods the expected rate of realignment ia below the interest
differentiel. When UIP is relaxed, in addition to the estimated expected
rate of depreciation within the band, one has to subtract the estimated riak
premium (figurea 3s~b.4) from the interest differentiel. Again, the latter
adjustment is in particular important for the lira~DM, and it is usually of
the seme order of magnitude as the adjustment for the estimated expected
rate of depreciation within the band only. Construction of estimates for the
expected rate of devaluation is along the same lines as for the expected
rate of realignment.
~. S~mamary and conclusiona
In this paper we have ahown for the Ffr~DM end the lira~DM, how estimates
for the expected rates of depreciation, realignment end devaluation cen be
constructed (under UIP and when UIP is relaxed) by non-trivial adjuatmenta
of interest differentials. These estimates give an indication about the
development of the credibility of the exchange rate system, which ia atill a
problem of major concern, as the events in September and November 1992 ahow.
Estimates for our variables of interest are obtained by using estimatea of
the expected rate of depreciation within the band, both unconditional and
conditional upon no realignment, and estimatea of the riak premium. It turna
out that for both the unconditional and conditional expected rate of
depreciation within the band, the current exchange rate position in the band
ia en important explanatory variable, while for the unconditional expected
rate of depreciation within the band, the forward discount plays an
important role also, especially for the Ffr~DM. The resulta suggeat the
presence of a small and almost constant risk premium for the Ffr~DM and ey
-17-
time-varying, sometimea sizable, risk premium for the lira~DM. Here the
forward discount capturea e large part of the time-variabílity. On the other
hend, fur nune uf Lhe exchenge relee, ll~e pualLlun li~ Lhe band eeean Lu
contribute to the explanation oP the risk premium, contrary to what one
might have expected. Estimates of the riak premium are also intereating in
their own right, because they give an indication of the credibility of the
exchange rate bend, and the costs associated with a lack of credibility.
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Appendix: The data
The data are daily from 13 March 1979 till 16 May 1990. They are taken from
e database created by Andrew Rose from BIS data. It is used and deacribed by
Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1991). We use spot exchange rate seriea, which
are recorded at daily 'official fixing'. The intereat rates are annualized
bid rates for 1 month Euro-market bills at around l0am Swias time. Asauming
CIP [eq.(2)], forward rates are constructed from intereat rates and exchange
rates. This is motivated by the fact that the interest rates are offahore
rates end therefore not subject to capital controls.
There are a number of misaing observations (in our terminology, any
Monday,..., Friday, with no observatíon recorded, counts for a misaing
observation). An observation of a variable, which is constructed from other
variables, will be missing, if at least one of the source variables ia
missing in this period. In absence of any missing observations, the total
number of observations would be 2917.-19-
Table la: Estimatea of the unconditional expected rate of depreciation
within the band for the Ffr~DM (annualized, in x); eq.(8b).
la) (b) (c)
constant -0.17 (0.70) 1.09 (0.66) 3.53 (0.74)
xt -3.34 (0.68) -1.08 (0.96) -2.86 (0.56)
xt - -1.16 (0.54) -
xt - -0.88 (0.32) -
ft.2-at
- - -7.90 (i-57)
N 2542 2542 2542
25.3 (1) Ho: p2-0 - -
Jx 24.0 (i) 27.4 (3) 35.8 (2)
Remarks:
1. Standard errors are given betureen brackets.
2. N fs the number of observations.
3. AL1 tests are chi-square dístributed under the nulL hypothests mtth the
degrees o1 freedom given bett~een brackets.
4. JH stands for the jofnt hypothesis that all coefficients except for
dummy coelfictents, or constant, are jointly equal to sero.
Table lb: Fstimatea ot the unconditional expected rate of depreciatian
within the band for the lira~D!! (annualized, in x); eq.(8b).
(a) (b) (c)
constant -0.31 (1.08) 2.94 (1.25) 6.46 (3.82)
xt -2.22 (0.54) -1.55 (0.71) -2.37 (0.56)
xt - -0.87 (0.32) -
xt - -o.i2 (.069) -
ft.i-st - - -9.16 (5.69)
N 2606 2606 2604
2.59 (i) No: p2-0 - -
JH 16.6 (1) i9.i (3) 17.8 (2)
Remarks:
1. See remarks 1 to 4 table la.-20-
Table ?a; Lstlmatea of the expected rate oP deprecíation aithin the band
conditional on no realignment for the Ffr~DM (annualized, ín x); eq.(l0e).
(g) (b) (c)
di 3.72 (0.90) 3.59 (0.93) 4.40 (1.16)
a2 -o.i8 (1.44) 0.71 (1.61) 0.65 (1.85)
d3 5.55 (2.49) 6.68 (2.76) 6.93 (3.34)
a4 z.83 (1.36) 3.z4 (1.46) 4.73 (2.52)
d5 -0.06 (0.55) 0.29 (0.59) i.o9 (1.27)
d6 3.95 (2.04) 3.75 (2.25) 4.56 (2.io)
d7 1.62 (0.88) 1.92 (1.02) 2.06 (0.97)
xt -1.98 (0.49) -0.34 (1.03) -1.81 (0.52)
xt - -0.46 (0.33)
xt - -0.60 (0.28)
ft.t-st - - -2.04 (2.17)
N 2426 2426 2426
HO'~Oi-~oldi 19.5 (6) 15.7 (6) 19.3 (6)
Ho:~2- 0 - - 0.89 (1)
JH 16.4 (i) 34.6 (3) 16.9 (2)
Remnrka:
1. See remarks 1 to 4 table la.-21-
Table 2b: Estimates of the expected rate of depreciation vithin the band
conditional on no realignment tor the lira~DM (annualized, in X): eq.(l0a).
(e) (b) (c)
dl -2.42 (2.57) -2.70 (2.95) -0.41 (3.19)
d2 4.25 (1.86) 4.88 (1.83) 6.80 (2.94)
a3 3.69 (2.86) 3.89 (2.87) 6.88 (3.22)
d4 7.11 (3.01) 7.25 (3.19) 10.2 (4.44)
d5 4.00 (3.20) 3.98 (3.47) 7.62 (4.83)
a6 1.22 (1.97) 2.17 (2.41) 3.92 (3.34)
a.~ 2.00 (1.44) 1.86 (1.43) 4.68 (2.95)
da o.37 (1.03) -.021 (1.51) 2.18 (2.04)
a9 3.32 (1.48) 4.40 (1.84) 4.86 (2.08)
dlo -6.75 (0.88) -7.10 (1.14) -5.56 (1.46)
xt -1.13 (0.46) -1.67 (0.71) -1.08 (0.45)
x~ - -0.14 (o.zo) -








99.8 (9) 100.2 (9) 75.0 (9)
1.13 (1)
6.1z (1) 11.8 (3) 8.18 (2)
Remarka:
1. See remarks 1 to 4 tabZe Ia.-22-
Table 3a: Estimates for the risk premium of
the Ffr~DM ( annualized, in X): eq.(8c).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
const 2.06 (0.75) 2.11 (0.78) 2.56 (0.89) 1.70 (1.14) 1.85 (1.06)
xt - 0.64 (0.80) -1.44 (1.06) - 0.56 (2.80)
xt - - -0.24 (0.69)
xt - - 0.68 (0.37)
ft,T-st
- - - 0.77 (2.92) 0.61 (0.70)
N 2545 254z 2542 2542 2542
JHlC 7.48 (1) 7.59 (2) 15.7 (4) 9.53 (2) 10.6 (3)
JHEC - 0.65 (1) 6.39 (3) 0.07 (1) 0.87 (2)
Remarka:
1. See remarks 1 to 3 tabZe la.
2. JH1C stands jor the hypothesis that all coef~ictenta are jointZy equaZ
to aero.
3. JHEC standa for the hHpothesis that all coef~icients, except for the
conatant, are ~ointZy equaZ to sero.
Table 3b: Estimatea for the riskpremium of
the lira~DM (ennualized, in x); eq.(8c).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
const 4.25 (0.94) 4.22 (0.97) 4.37 (1.31) -1.68 (2.61) -1.68 (2.62)
xt - -0.14 (0.44) 0.38 (0.75) - -.0068 (0.45)
xt - - -.067 (0.25) - -
xt - - -.046 (.060) - -
ft.T-st - - - 7.98 (3.57) 7.98 (3.65)
N 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604
JHIC 20.5 (1) 24.6 (2) 26.9 (4) 22.6 (2) 27.4 (3)
JHEC - 0.01 (1) 1.50 (3) 4.99 (1) 5.25 (2)
Remarka:
1. See remarks 1 to 3 tabZe 3a.F'igure la: log(Ffr~DM) with bounderies.
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Figure 2b.2: Fit of Et[nxt~T)~t (Table lb; column (c)]; lirs~OM.Figure 2b.3: Fit oP EL[Axt~,~~NR]~t [Table 2b; column (c)]; 11ra~DM.
Figure 2b.4: Fit of EL[ft.,~- at~,~J~i [Table 3b; column (e)J; lira~DM.Discusslon Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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